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Joined cases C-569/16 and C-570/16 Bauer et al: (Most of) The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights Is Horizontally Applicable 
 
Dr Eleni Frantziou*  
 
I. Introduction  
Can the Charter be invoked in disputes between private parties, thus creating a coherent 
constitutional basis for horizontality for fundamental rights, or does its limited scope of 
application preclude its use in horizontal disputes as a self-standing source of law? That was 
the constitutional question at the heart of the Grand Chamber’s recent ruling in Bauer.1   
 
There is little doubt that, for a long time, the EU horizontality doctrine was, as a 2006 editorial 
of the Common Market Law Review had put it, ‘a law of diminishing coherence’.2 The 
insistence on the non-horizontality of directives from Marshall3 onwards led to the adoption of 
often unpredictable exceptions, exemplified in the Mangold judgment,4 which generated 
substantial legitimacy challenges5 and bids to ‘stop the European Court of Justice’.6 It was 
within this terse legal background that a nearly decade-long debate about the horizontal direct 
effect of the Charter emerged.7 Supporters of a cautious approach pointed to the problems of 
                                                     
* Assistant Professor in Public Law and Human Rights, Durham Law School, University of Durham. Email 
contact: eleni.frantziou@durham.ac.uk. I am very grateful for the detailed comments I have received at the 
reviewing and editorial stages of the publication process, as well as to the editors of the European Law Blog for 
their comments on an earlier version of this note. Any errors remain, of course, solely my own. 
1 ECJ 6 November 2018, Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16, Stadt Wuppertal and Volker Willmeroth als 
Inhaber der TWI Technische Wartung und Instandsetzung Volker Willmeroth e. K. v Maria Elisabeth Bauer and 
Martina Broßonn, EU:C:2018:871. 
2 Editorial comments, ‘Horizontal Direct Effect—A Law of Diminishing Coherence?’ 43:1 CMLRev (2006), p. 
1, at p. 1. 
3 ECJ 26 February 1986, Case C-271/91, Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health 
Authority (Teaching), ECR 723. 
4 ECJ 22 November 2005, Case C-144/04, Mangold v Helm, ECR I-9981; see also ECJ 19 January 2010, Case 
C-555/07, Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH, ECR I-365. 
5 German Constitutional Court 6 July 2010, Honeywell—BVerfGE 126 (Az: 2 BvR 2661/06). For a detailed 
discussion, see: M Payandeh, ‘Constitutional Review of EU Law after Honeywell: Contextualising the 
Relationship between the German Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice’ 48 CMLRev (2011), 
p. 9; C Möllers, ‘German Federal Constitutional Court: Constitutional Ultra Vires Review of European Acts 
Only Under Exceptional Circumstances; Decision of 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, Honeywell’ 7:1 EuConst 
(2011), p. 161. 
6 R Herzog and L Gerken, ‘Stop the European Court of Justice’, EU Observer, 10 September 2008, 
<https://euobserver.com/opinion/26714> visited 24 September 2018. 
7 An overview is provided in the Opinion of Advocate General Bot, delivered on 29 May 2018, in Joined Cases 
C–569/16, Stadt Wuppertal v Maria Elisabeth Bauer and C-570/16 Volker Willmeroth als Inhaber der TWI 
Technische Wartung und Instandsetzung Volker Willmeroth e. K. v Martina Broßonn, EU:C:2018:337 (hereafter 
‘Bauer Opinion’) paras 77-8; see further E Frantziou, The Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights in the 
European Union: A Constitutional Analysis (OUP 2019), chapter 4.  
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the Mangold ruling and the text of Article 51(1) of the Charter, which is addressed to Member 
States and Union institutions, arguing that the principle of horizontality should not be extended 
to its substantive provisions.8 Others advocated a more expansive approach, founded upon the 
coherent and effective application of fundamental rights to all legal disputes, against the state 
and private actors alike.9  
 
In Bauer et al, the Court’s Grand Chamber finally puts this debate to rest, in favour of the latter 
interpretation. Bauer is the latest of a set of rulings during the last year, including Egenberger 
and IR,10 which set the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter apart from prior rules on 
horizontality. But it is an especially significant part of that puzzle, because it brings the earlier 
case law together and clarifies its breadth within the field of EU fundamental rights 
jurisprudence where the abovementioned debate was most readily manifested: the social rights 
enshrined in the Charter’s Solidarity chapter (in this case, the right to paid annual leave 
protected in Article 31(2) thereof). It was indeed in this field that, not long ago, the Court had 
refrained from clarifying the reach of the horizontality doctrine and the status of different 
provisions of the Charter, first in Dominguez and, perhaps most starkly, in its heavily criticised 
judgment in Association de Médiation Sociale (hereafter ‘AMS’).11 
 
This comment has a threefold purpose. At a first stage, it analyses the key features of the Bauer 
ruling (part II). It then seeks to reconstruct what might now, safely in my view, be described 
                                                     
8 The most significant challenge to the horizontal effect of the Charter was mounted by Advocate General 
Trstenjak in her Opinion in Dominguez, a case which concerned the very same right (paid annual leave): 
Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, delivered on 8 September 2011, in Case C-282/10, Dominguez v 
Centre Informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and Préfet de la Région Centre, EU:C:2011:559 (hereafter 
‘Dominguez Opinion’), paras 80–83; see also C Ladenburger, ‘FIDE Conference 2012 Institutional Report’ 
(2012) XXV FIDE Congress, Tallinn, 30 May–2 June 2012, 34–5. 
9 See, e.g., D Leczykiewicz, ‘Horizontal Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ 38:4 EL Rev (2013), 
p. 479; E Frantziou, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Rediscovering the 
Reasons for Horizontality’ 21:5 ELJ (2015), p. 657. Advocate General Cruz Villalón had powerfully advocated 
this approach, especially in his Opinions in Prigge and Association de médiation sociale – uncharacteristically, 
not followed by the Court: Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, delivered on 19 May 2011, in Case C-
447/09 Prigge and Others v Deutsche Lufthansa, EU:C:2011:321; Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, 
delivered on 18 July 2013, in Case C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats 
CGT, EU:C:2013:491. 
10 ECJ 11 September 2018, Case C-68/17 IR v JQ, EU:C:2018:696; ECJ 17 April 2018, Case C-414/16, 
Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung e.V, EU:C:2018:257, further discussed in a 
separate note in this issue. See also the ruling of the Court in Max Planck, which was rendered on the same day 
as the Bauer judgment, further confirming its bearing: ECJ 6 November 2018, Case C‑684/16, Max-Planck-
Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V. v Tetsuji Shimizu, EU:C:2018:874. 
11 ECJ 15 January 2014, Case C-176/12, Association de Médiation Sociale (AMS) v Union Locale des Syndicats 
CGT Hichem Laboubi Union Départementale CGT des Bouches-du-Rhône Confédération Générale du Travail 
(CGT), EU:C:2014:2. See also ECJ 24 January 2012, Case C-282/10, Dominguez v Centre Informatique du 
Centre Ouest Atlantique and Préfet de la Région Centre, EU:C:2012:33. 
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as the current position on the horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the European Union 
and assesses the contribution the case makes in this regard (part III). Finally, the note argues 
that Bauer offers food for thought about the desirability and possible future directions of 
horizontality in respect of fundamental employment rights (part IV). How can the ruling be 
related to the Court’s broader analysis of horizontality? Is it convincing in its painstaking 
reaffirmation-but-containment of Marshall and AMS? Examining these questions brings the 
note to a mildly sombre ending: it is argued that, whilst Bauer solidifies some positive changes 
in respect of the constitutional recognition of the Charter, it would be too quick to assume that 
it amounts to the effective recognition of fundamental rights in the workplace – a feat which 
would require a more thorough revision of the relationship between fundamental rights and 
market freedoms in horizontal disputes within the Union’s public order. 
 
II. Analysis of the Ruling 
A. The legal context and questions before the Court  
Bauer is not a single case: it stems from two, in all but one respect identical, sets of facts. The 
first case, C-569/16, concerned a dispute between Stadt Wuppertal and Mrs Maria Elisabeth 
Bauer. The second case, C-570/16, concerned a dispute between Mr Volker Willmeroth, in his 
capacity as owner of the TWI Technische Wartung und Instandsetzung Volker Willmeroth e.K. 
(a private company) and Mrs Martina Broßonn. The Stadt Wuppertal and Mr Willmeroth had 
been the last employers of the late husbands of Mrs Bauer and Mrs Broßonn, respectively. Both 
had refused to pay the claimants an allowance in lieu of annual leave not taken by their spouses 
before their death.  
 
Under German law, paragraph 7(4) of the revised Bundesurlaubsgesetz (Federal law on leave) 
(BGBl. 2002 I, p 1529) (hereinafter referred to as ‘BUrlG’) provides for payment in lieu of 
leave in case of termination of the employment relationship, while paragraph 1922(1) of the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code) (hereinafter referred to as ‘BGB’) provides that the 
estate of a deceased person passes in whole to their heirs. The relevant legal context at the EU 
level is, as mentioned above, Article 31(2) of the Charter, which provides that ‘every worker 
has the right to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to 
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an annual period of paid leave’. Secondary EU legislation occupying this field further clarifies 
the meaning of the right in question. Article 7 of Directive 2003/8812 provides that: 
1.      Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that every worker is 
entitled to paid annual leave of at least four weeks in accordance with the conditions 
for entitlement to, and granting of, such leave laid down by national legislation and/or 
practice. 
2.      The minimum period of paid annual leave may not be replaced by an allowance 
in lieu, except where the employment relationship is terminated. 
 
Applying the finding of the Court of Justice in Bollacke13 that an annual leave entitlement 
cannot be altogether lost upon a person’s death, German courts had initially granted the claims 
of both Mrs Bauer and Mrs Broßonn. On appeal, however, the proceedings were stayed, as 
they raised questions about the applicability of this finding to the present context, particularly 
in case it was impossible to interpret Articles 7(4) BUrlG and Article 1922(1) BGB as 
comprising death of the employee within the concept of ‘termination’, thus making a payment 
in lieu of leave part of their estate. Joining the two cases, the Court of Justice reconstructed the 
national courts’ questions as follows: 
 
(1)      Does Article 7 of Directive [2003/88] or Article 31(2) of the [Charter] grant the 
heir of a worker who died while in an employment relationship a right to financial 
compensation for the worker’s minimum annual leave prior to his death, which is 
precluded by Paragraph 7(4) of the BUrlG, read in conjunction with Paragraph 1922(1) 
of the BGB? 
 
(2)      If the first question is answered in the affirmative: does this also apply where the 
employment relationship is between two private persons?14 
 
In other words, the first question in the case was about the correct interpretation of the right to 
paid annual leave and the second question was procedural/constitutional, as it concerned the 
horizontal direct effect of a right further concretised in a directive. Thus, whilst for those of us 
with an Anglo-Saxon keyboard calling the cases ‘Bauer’ avoids the uncomfortable Eszett in 
Mrs Broßonn’s surname, it was in fact her case that made the judgment especially significant.  
For, even though the right to paid annual leave was engaged in both of the joined cases, it is 
                                                     
12 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain 
aspects of the organisation of working time, OJ L 299/9, 18.11.2003. 
13 ECJ 12 June 2014, Case C-118/13 Bollacke v K + K Klaas & Kock B.V. & Co. KG, EU:C:2014:1755. 
14 Bauer, supra n 1, para 19. 
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trite EU law ‘that a directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual and that a 
provision of a directive may not be relied upon as such against such a person.’15  
 
B. The Opinion and Judgment 
The judgment was certainly influenced by the elaborate Opinion that preceded it. Maintaining 
a position he has consistently defended from Kücükdeveci onwards,16 Advocate General Bot 
invited the Court to reconsider previous interpretations of fundamental rights based on general 
principles or ‘particularly important principles of EU social law’ and to confirm, once and for 
all, that the social rights enshrined in the Charter are equally fundamental to its other 
provisions.17 The Advocate General developed his argument in close conversation with earlier 
case law and, in a remarkable effort to reconcile Kücükdeveci and AMS, sought to clarify that 
Kücükdeveci should not have been interpreted as meaning that only Charter provisions further 
expressed in directives enjoy horizontal direct effect. Rather, it was the constitutional character 
of the Charter that had led to the finding in Kücükdeveci, which therefore did not depend on 
‘further expression’ in a directive.18  
 
Advocate General Bot then took care to distinguish the present case from the AMS ruling. 
Unlike Article 27, which refers to ‘national laws and practices’, the Advocate General argued 
that Article 31 was clearly mandatory and specific enough to be relied upon in itself – this 
finding not being dependent on whether a dispute was between private parties as opposed to 
between a private party and the state.19 His argument was built upon the holy grail of the 
precedent in this field: paragraph 39 of Defrenne II and its finding that the need  to observe 
rules of a ‘mandatory nature’ applies ‘not only to the action of public authorities, but also 
extends to all agreements which are intended to regulate paid labour collectively, as well as to 
contracts between individuals’.20 On this basis, the Advocate General asked the Court to 
reaffirm its position in Egenberger by declaring that those provisions of the Charter which have 
a mandatory nature (i.e. are not principles or aspirations?) are horizontally applicable as such, 
                                                     
15 Marshall, supra n 3, para 48.  
16 See Opinion of Advocate General Bot, delivered on 7 July 2009, in Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci v Swedex 
GmbH [2010] ECR I-365; Opinion of Advocate General Bot, delivered on 25 November 2015, in Case C-
441/14, Dansk Industri (DI) v Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen, EU:C:2015:776. 
17 Bauer Opinion, supra n 7, para 57, citing ECJ 29 November 2017, Case C-214/16, King, EU:C:2017:914, 
para 32. 
18 Bauer Opinion, supra n 7, paras 74-76. 
19 Ibid, paras 79-81. 
20 ECJ 8 April 1986, Case 43/75, Defrenne v Sabena, ECR 455, para 39. 
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thus removing any remaining doubt regarding the need for further implementation of these 
rights in secondary legislation.21  
 
The Court agreed and, in contrast to its earlier case law in this field, its ruling was especially 
detailed and methodical – laudable developments in their own right. First, the Court unpacked 
the content of the right to paid annual leave carefully and explained that the proviso limiting 
payment in lieu of leave to cases of termination was intended to ensure the meaningfulness of 
that right both during (so that employers do not coerce their employees not to take leave) and 
after the end of the employment relationship.22 The reason for termination was immaterial: 
death marks the unfortunate but inevitable end of many employment relations.23 Furthermore, 
the Court reasoned, annual leave has a measurable, pecuniary dimension, which does not 
dissipate upon the death of an employee, as it has been accumulated during his/her 
employment.24  
 
Having thus set out the meaning of the right to paid annual leave, the Court also followed the 
Advocate General’s suggestion to revise the overcomplicated distinctions between different 
rights in EU law, lingering in a long line of case law in this field and creating substantial and 
‘unnecessary ambiguity’ therein.25  It found that  
the right to paid annual leave, as a principle of EU social law, is not only particularly 
important, but is also expressly laid down in Article 31(2) of the Charter, which 
Article 6(1) TEU recognises as having the same legal value as the Treaties.26 
 
It was thus the constitutional status of this provision, and not its designation as a ‘general’ or 
‘particularly important’ principle of EU law, that led the Court to its answer to the first 
question. Leaving the Directive aside entirely, the Court found that Article 31(2) of the Charter 
in itself has the effect of limiting the Member States’ discretion to retroactively remove the 
enjoyment of the right, e.g. by prohibiting payment in lieu after a person’s death.27 National 
law and other aspects of EU law, including the Directive, should be interpreted in accordance 
with that core obligation.  
                                                     
21 Bauer Opinion, supra n 7, para 76, citing Egenberger, supra n 10. 
22 Bauer, supra n 1, paras 42-43. 
23 Ibid, para 46. 
24 Ibid, para 48. 
25 L Pech, ‘Between Judicial Minimalism and Avoidance: The Court of Justice’s Sidestepping of Fundamental 
Constitutional Issues in Römer and Dominguez’ 49:6 CML Rev (2012), p. 1841, at p. 1857. 
26 Bauer, supra n 1, para 51. 
27 Ibid, paras 61-63. 
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But there is a difference between saying that entitlements accrued in accordance with Article 
31 do not dissipate upon a person’s death and saying that these entitlements can be invoked by 
the heirs of the person having accrued them in order to produce a remedy in a private dispute. 
While the former finding concerns the meaning of the right in general, the latter relates to the 
more technical aspects of the case and, more precisely, to the question about the direct effect 
of EU law. In this regard, the Court firstly affirmed the possibility of reliance on directives 
against the state.28 It thus dealt quickly with Mrs Bauer’s case, which concerned a public 
employer, before turning to the more complicated question raised by Mrs Broßonn’s 
circumstances. In analysing her case against Mr Willmeroth, the Court reaffirmed the non-
horizontality of directives, even when these are clear, precise, and unconditional.29 Mrs 
Broßonn could not have relied upon the Directive in a dispute with her late husband’s 
employer. Whereas the Marshall rule remains valid in theory, though, the existence of the 
Charter limits its relevance in the fundamental rights context.  
 
The Court quickly went on to mediate the above limitation, through an affirmation of the 
possibility of direct effect for the Charter in both vertical and horizontal disputes. To do so, it 
returned to the nature of Article 31(2) of the Charter and examined its potential for horizontality 
as a self-standing provision of EU primary law. In this respect, following the analysis of its 
Advocate General,30 the Court acknowledged the existence of a debate over the scope of 
application of the Charter and definitively (and, in my view, correctly) resolved it:  
[A]lthough Article 51(1) of the Charter states that the provisions thereof are addressed 
to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union with due regard 
for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are 
implementing EU law, Article 51(1) does not, however, address the question whether 
those individuals may, where appropriate, be directly required to comply with certain 
provisions of the Charter and cannot, accordingly, be interpreted as meaning that it 
would systematically preclude such a possibility.31 
 
In these terms, Bauer et al unequivocally affirms the Charter’s horizontality, as a matter of 
constitutional principle. The Court then goes on to analyse the conditions under which specific 
provisions might be applied horizontally. On this point, too, the Court follows the Advocate 
General’s approach, finding that Article 31(2) is mandatory and specific enough (though the 
                                                     
28 Ibid, paras 70-72. 
29 Ibid, paras 77.  
30 Bauer Opinion, supra n 7, paras 77-78. 
31 Bauer, supra n 1, para 87. 
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Court does translate this into a, potentially, more stringent requirement of unconditionality, 
which could restrict its application to certain provisions).32 As the Court puts it: 
The right to a period of paid annual leave, affirmed for every worker by Article 31(2) 
of the Charter, is thus, as regards its very existence, both mandatory and unconditional 
in nature, the unconditional nature not needing to be given concrete expression by the 
provisions of EU or national law, which are only required to specify the exact duration 
of annual leave and, where appropriate, certain conditions for the exercise of that 
right.33 
 
It follows that Charter provisions which are mandatory and unconditional are horizontal, with 
or without further expression in secondary legislation.  
 
The question that, of course, remains is which provisions these are. The case law has now 
provided a range of examples: the Bauer judgment affirms last April’s ruling in Egenberger 
(and, more recently, in IR), meaning that Articles 31(2), 47, and 21, are in themselves sufficient 
to provide redress to individuals in private disputes.34 At the same time, though, Bauer 
emphatically distinguishes and reaffirms AMS on its facts.35 As I discuss further in the 
following sections, this raises concerns regarding the fate of Article 27 and, presumably, of all 
rights that refer to national laws and practices. Yet before turning to a critique of the judgment, 
it is worth briefly analysing its last substantive part, which considers the available remedies.36  
 
From an orthodox EU law perspective, the immediate implication of the case might appear to 
be not only that there is a right to paid annual leave in the Union against public and private 
employers, but that there is also a corresponding obligation on these employers to comply with 
it directly. This is likely true in practice, but only partly so in terms of the constitutional 
structure the Court proposes. The mandatory and unconditional nature of the right (i.e. the fact 
that it enjoys horizontal direct effect under EU law) means that: 
if the [national] court is unable to interpret the national legislation at issue in a manner 
ensuring its compliance with Article 31(2) of the Charter, it will therefore be required, 
in a situation such as that in the particular legal context of Case C-570/16, to ensure, 
                                                     
32 Ibid, paras 82-83. While ‘unconditionality’ is, of course, part of the classic formula for vertical direct effect as 
well, cases such as Reyners had relaxed its operation in practice substantially: see Case 2/74, Reyners v Belgium 
[1974] ECR 63. The use of unconditionality in Bauer seems, in turn, to support what appears to be the Court’s 
overall position stemming from this case law, namely that conditionality upon national laws and practices 
diminishes a particular provision’s potential of being used in a horizontal dispute (a good example of which 
remains Article 27 EUCFR as seen in the AMS ruling,  supra n 11).  
33 Ibid, para 85. 
34 Ibid. See also IR v JQ, supra n 10 and the note on these rulings in this issue. 
35 Bauer, supra n 1, para 84. 
36 Ibid, paras 90-91. 
 9 
within its jurisdiction, the judicial protection for individuals flowing from that 
provision and to guarantee the full effectiveness thereof by disapplying if need be that 
national legislation (see, by analogy, judgment of 17 April 2018, Egenberger, 
C-414/16, EU:C:2018:257, paragraph 76).37  
 
The ruling thus seems to confirm a trend traceable to Dansk Industri38 but, as noted in the 
judgment, more explicitly assumed in Egenberger, which is no longer to harmonise the 
remedial stage of the process by stipulating the direct use of a fundamental right in a private 
relationship (note the absence of a reference to Mangold and Kücükdeveci). Rather, the Court 
appears to be prepared to allow national courts to guarantee the full effectiveness of the right 
through any appropriate means including, but perhaps not limited to, its disapplication. 
 
III. The significance of the Bauer ruling: fundamental social rights matter in 
vertical and in horizontal disputes 
Based on the set of findings laid down above, it appears to me that the Bauer ruling makes 
three significant contributions to fundamental rights law in the European Union: it affirms the 
status of the Charter’s social rights; it settles the question of the Charter’s horizontality in 
principle and, indeed, by reference to its most controversial set of provisions (those found in 
Chapter IV); and, finally, it clarifies aspects of the operation of  the doctrine of horizontal direct 
effect. This section analyses each of these contributions in turn. 
 
First, and perhaps most importantly, the ruling confirms that the fundamental social rights 
enshrined in the Charter have a normative core that is applicable in all disputes that fall within 
the scope of EU law. As noted in the introduction, it was as part of its case law on the Solidarity 
chapter that the Court had limited any argument in favour an overarching constitutional 
analysis of the Charter by finding, in AMS, that certain provisions did not have a ‘rights-
conferring’ nature,39 thus excluding their meaningful effect.40 The Bauer case to some extent 
revises this approach, by formally acknowledging the inclusion of social rights in a ‘written 
constitution.’41 While it should be noted carefully that Bauer does not overrule AMS, so that 
                                                     
37 Ibid, para 91, my emphasis. 
38 ECJ 19 April 2016, Case C-441/14, Dansk Industri (DI) v Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen, 
EU:C:2016:278, paras 29-35. 
39 AMS, supra n 11, para 47. 
40 See further E Frantziou, ‘Case C-176/12 Association de Médiation Sociale: Some Reflections on the 
Horizontal Effect of the Charter and the Reach of Fundamental Employment Rights in the European Union’ 10 
EuConst (2014), p. 332. 
41 Prigge Opinion, supra n 9, para 26.  
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the most contentious set of provisions found in the Charter (collective employment rights) may 
remain limited in their effects insofar as they are conditional upon national laws and practices 
– a critique to which I return in the following section – the ruling does clarify that all 
fundamental rights should be taken into account in the interpretation of national law before 
considering their ability to produce direct effect. It thus signals a marked and, in my view, 
welcome revision of one of the most problematic aspects of the AMS judgment: it confirms that 
the Charter’s provisions are indivisible in their constitutional status, even if they are not directly 
effective. Indeed, unlike its rejection of any form of horizontality in AMS, the Court in Bauer 
appears to embrace the idea that fundamental rights are capable of radiating across the legal 
system of the European Union, in vertical as well as in horizontal disputes.42 And, in this way, 
fundamental social rights do not become, as Advocate General Bot had so aptly put it, a ‘mere 
entreaty.’43  
 
A second, albeit related, point of note is that the judgment fits into a series of cases offering 
more detailed guidance regarding the horizontal direct effect of the Charter, including 
Egenberger and IR,44 thus presenting a glimmer of hope that the lack of clarity following cases 
like Mangold, Kücükdeveci, and AMS, is finally behind us. An especially positive dimension 
of the ruling was the very joining of the Bauer and Broßonn cases, which drew out in the 
clearest way the problems of non-horizontality, both for the protection of fundamental rights 
in the Union and for the coherence of EU law: in bringing together a case against a public 
employer and a case against a private employer in the same factual scenario, the Court offered 
an illustration of the substantive unfairness in which the lack of horizontal direct effect of 
directives could have resulted. This concern had already been echoed in the academic literature 
for many years, as well as in Advocate Generals’ Opinions as early as Faccini Dori.45 As the 
                                                     
42 I borrow the idea of a ‘radiating effect’ (or ‘Ausstrahlungswirkung’) from German constitutional theory: R 
Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (tr J Rivers, OUP 2002), p. 355; see also German Constitutional Court 
15 January 1958, Lüth—BverfGE 7, 198 (Az: 1 BvR 400/51). 
43 Bauer Opinion, supra n 7, para 95, ‘une simple incantation’ citing the wording of R Tinière, ‘L’invocabilité 
des principes de la Charte des droits fondamentaux dans les litiges horizontaux’ Revue des droits et libertés 
fondamentaux (2014) Chronicle No 14. 
44 See further the note on Egenberger and IR in this issue.  
45 Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, delivered on 9 February 1994, in Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v Recreb 
Srl [1994] ECR I-03325, paras 50–57. In the academic commentary, see PP Craig, ‘Directives, Direct Effect, 
Indirect Effect and the Construction of National Legislation’ 22 ELR (1997), p. 519; T Tridimas, ‘Horizontal 
Direct Effect of Directives: A Missed Opportunity?’ 19 ELR (1994), p. 621; D Kinley, ‘Direct Effect of 
Directives: Stuck on Vertical Hold’ 1 EPL (1995), p. 79; R Mastroianni, ‘On the Distinction Between Vertical 
and Horizontal Effects of Community Directives: What Role for the Principle of Equality?’ 5 EPL (1999), p. 
417; T Tridimas, ‘Black White and Shades of Grey: Horizontality of Directives Revisited’ 21 YEL (2002), p. 
327. 
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famous dictum goes, like cases should be treated alike. In Bauer, the Court appears to recognise 
the problems its earlier case law was creating in this respect, at least in the fundamental rights 
context, where rights of a very similar character suffered a different fate depending on their 
source in EU legislation and, subsequently, their (subjectively determined) status as general 
principles of EU law in line with Mangold/Kücükdeveci.  
 
In fact, Bauer is especially important because it forms part of a faction of the horizontal effect 
jurisprudence in which exceptions to the non-horizontality rule, such as the one set out in the 
Mangold/Kücükdeveci saga, had never operated. Arguably, in the light of this line of case law, 
the main question for the Court had never been whether provisions of the Charter that 
previously enjoyed (or almost certainly would have enjoyed) horizontal direct effect as general 
principles of EU law would also enjoy such effect under the Charter. Rather, as Advocate 
General Trstenjak had noted in her Opinion in Dominguez, the key question was whether 
provisions such as the right to paid annual leave, which did not previously enjoy general 
principle status and were therefore not readily comprised within the exception created by the 
Mangold/Kücükdeveci saga, should now also acquire horizontality, in virtue of their inclusion 
in the Charter alone.46 The Grand Chamber’s judgment in Bauer largely – though not without 
reservations – answers this question affirmatively.  
 
Thus, while the scope of application of the Charter remains a difficult matter, Bauer leaves no 
doubt that, as a solid constitutional proclamation of rights, it is not subject to the application of 
any rules concerning directives, but to conditions similar to those applicable to other aspects 
of EU primary law. Even though the Charter ‘is not literally freestanding’ and presupposes 
‘some lock onto EU law’ in order to apply, once a situation is deemed to fall within the scope 
of EU law, horizontality is not excluded in virtue of the text of Article 51(1) for any part of the 
Charter.47 Just as Advocate General Cruz-Villalón had put it in his noteworthy Opinion in AMS 
(which was not followed by the Court at the time), through its more recent rulings, the Court 
now seems to accept that ‘there is nothing in the wording of the article or […] in the preparatory 
works or the Explanations relating to the Charter, which suggests that there was any intention 
[…] to address the very complex issue of the effectiveness of fundamental rights in relations 
                                                     
46 Dominguez Opinion, supra n 8, paras 128–135. 
47 PP Craig, ‘The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action: A Conceptual Analysis’ 48:2 CML Rev (2011), p. 395, at p. 434; 
see also D Sarmiento, ‘Who’s Afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, National Courts and the New 
Framework of Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe’ 50:5 CML Rev (2013), p. 1267, at p. 1275–6. 
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between individuals.’48 In other words, the inclusion of a right within the Charter can be a 
sufficient reason for horizontal effect when a case falls within the scope of EU law, even for 
rights that previously might not have had general principle status: having found a place in the 
Charter means that these rights should now be considered to enjoy that status, even if the Court 
had not previously decided it.49  
 
A final point of significance in this case is what I interpret as a tentative clarification of the 
existing doctrine of horizontal direct effect. The omission of an explicit reference to direct 
effect in paragraph 91 of the ruling might be easy to overlook. However, read in the light of 
the cases and Opinions that preceded it, including perhaps the outright rejection of the Mangold 
doctrine by the Danish Supreme Court,50 the judgment appears to make a careful and accurate 
procedural adjustment to the horizontality case law. This appears to me to be that the direct 
effect of EU law refers to its invocability in a dispute before national courts and not to the 
remedies offered at national level – a stance that was pioneered by the reporting judge in her 
academic capacity.51 While Member States must ensure that a remedy is offered within the 
dispute in question including by disapplying national legislation, if that is required in the 
circumstances, the ruling does not stipulate that the right should be applied in a direct manner 
in the private dispute as a matter of EU law. Lenaerts and Corthaut have previously highlighted, 
for instance, that ‘the power of a rigorously applied duty of consistent interpretation should not 
be underestimated.’52 
 
                                                     
48 AMS Opinion, supra n 9, para 31. 
49 This is consonant with a position previously advocated by the Court’s President, Judge Lenaerts, albeit in his 
academic capacity, arguing that all provisions of the Charter should be seen as having the status of general 
principles: K Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ 8:3 EuConst (2012), p. 
375, at p. 376; see also K Lenaerts and J Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General 
Principles of EU Law’ 47 CML Rev (2010) p. 1629, at p. 1656 et seq.  
50 Danish Supreme Court 6 December 2016, Case no 15/2014, DI acting for Ajos A/S v The Estate left by A. For 
an analysis of this case, see MR Madsen, HP Olsen, and U Šadl, ‘Competing Supremacies and Clashing 
Institutional Rationalities: the Danish Supreme Court's Decision in the Ajos Case and the National Limits of 
Judicial Cooperation’ 23(1-2) ELJ (2017), p. 140; S Klinge, ‘Dialogue or Disobedience between the European 
Court of Justice and the Danish Constitutional Court? The Danish Supreme Court Challenges the Mangold-
Principle’, EU Law Analysis Blog, 13 December 2016, <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/12/dialogue-
or-disobedience-between.html> visited 24 September 2018. See also the German Constitutional Court’s 
judgment in Honeywell, supra n 5, para 61. 
51 See, e.g., S Prechal, ‘Does Direct Effect Still Matter?’ 37:5 CML Rev (2000), p. 1047. For a more recent 
account, see Robin-Olivier S, ‘The Evolution of Direct Effect in the EU: Stocktaking, Problems, Projections’ 12 
ICON (2014), p. 165. 
52 K Lenaerts and T Corthaut, ‘Of birds and hedges: the role of primacy in invoking norms of EU law’ 31:3 EL 
Rev (2006), p. 287, at p. 293. 
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As I have argued in more detail elsewhere,53 this approach should be welcomed in this field: 
not only is it constitutionally more refined than an assumption that direct effect equals the direct 
application of a right in a private dispute but, provided the relevant standard of protection has 
been clearly interpreted by the Court, as is the case in Bauer, it does not raise concerns about 
effectiveness. In cases involving the state, there is often parity between the invocability of the 
right and the remedy offered. Yet, in horizontal disputes, different legal systems have 
historically incorporated fundamental rights in a variety of ways – for example, by imposing 
an obligation through an extensive reading-in of the relevant right, by requiring the state to step 
in to protect the victim of a violation and, in only a few instances, by directly placing a 
constitutional duty on a private actor.54 Beyond an appeal to primacy which, as recently 
highlighted by the Danish response, never took seed in national courts, it is unclear what benefit 
accrues to individuals from fundamental rights derived from EU law being applied differently 
from other fundamental rights within the legal orders of the Member States, and indeed being 
applied directly, if their meaningful effect would not have otherwise been compromised.55 
Echoing Egenberger, Bauer now suggests that, as long as the means used are outcome-neutral, 
i.e. do not place the aggrieved party at a disadvantage or leave them without redress simply 
due to the structures of national law, a space can be carved out for the constitutional complexity 
of horizontality to be accommodated within EU discourse.  
 
Where, then, does Bauer leave us in respect of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights in 
the EU? Taking account of the recent Grand Chamber judgments in this field, the position now 
appears to be the following. Firstly, the Charter is capable of producing indirect and direct 
horizontal effect in principle because, in line with Article 6(1) TEU, it has ‘the same legal value 
as the Treaties’. Its scope of application does not preclude such a finding. National courts 
should thus first strive to interpret national law in the light of any materially relevant provision 
of the Charter. Secondly, even if an interpretation of national law in conformity with the right 
is impossible and the right in question is mandatory and unconditional (its ‘unconditional 
nature not needing to be given concrete expression by the provisions of EU or national law’),56 
so that the right is directly invokable in private disputes as such, the national courts’ ability to 
develop the legislation in a manner that is compatible with fundamental rights is not diminished 
                                                     
53 See Frantziou, Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights, supra n 7, chapters 6 and 8.  
54 Ibid, chapter 2. 
55 Ibid, chapter 8.  
56 Bauer, supra n 1, para 85. 
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but, in such cases, national courts must ensure that a remedy is offered within the dispute in 
question. Failing that, state liability in damages may be claimed. 
 
If my analysis is correct, this is a clearer and more coherent endorsement of the horizontal 
effect of fundamental rights. At least from the perspective of constitutional design, but in my 
view also from the perspective of the effective protection of fundamental rights, which depends 
increasingly on compliance by private actors, Bauer should be (moderately) celebrated. At the 
same time, however, as the final section of this comment highlights, one should not necessarily 
assume that Bauer marks a drastic revision of horizontal effect altogether or that it provides 
sufficient protection in respect of all fundamental rights. Most importantly, in distinguishing 
the present case from AMS (rather than revising it altogether), the Court’s ruling in Bauer does 
not go quite as far as perhaps one might have hoped.  
 
IV. A critical query: do all fundamental social rights matter equally? 
While Bauer seemingly confines AMS to its well-deserved ‘isolated corner’,57 the Court’s 
continued appeal to the differences between rights such as information and consultation within 
the undertaking and rights such as paid annual leave is more problematic than it might initially 
appear. Of course, there is a technical reason for differentiating AMS from Bauer: unlike Article 
31, Article 27 defers to national laws and practices. However, placing an acute emphasis on 
that distinction is problematic both in terms of the protection of collective employment rights 
and in terms of coherence with the Court’s case law beyond the Solidarity chapter. It thus 
largely undermines the – otherwise positive – bearing of the Bauer ruling on the status of social 
rights in the Union overall. 
 
As Collins puts it, the deference to national laws and practices in respect of certain rights 
stipulates limitations to the core obligation and not only to the application of these rights to 
private disputes.58 In turn, if their conditionality on national laws and practices is the reason 
why certain provisions of the Charter are not invokable as such, then consistent interpretation, 
to which the Court appeals as the first step of its analysis, would actually matter very little in 
                                                     
57 D Sarmiento, ‘Sharpening the Teeth of EU Social Fundamental Rights: Comment on Bauer’, Despite Our 
Differences, 8 November 2018, <https://despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com/2018/11/08/sharpening-the-
teeth-of-eu-social-fundamental-rights-a-comment-on-bauer/> visited 5 December 2018. 
58 H Collins, ‘On the (In)Compatibility of Human Rights Discourse and Private Law’ (2012) LSE Law, Society 
and Economy Working Papers 7/2012, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/law/working-paper-series/2007-08/WPS2012-07-
Collins.pdf> accessed 24 September 2018, 10.  
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their regard (because the obligation in the light of which national law should be interpreted 
would itself logically depend on what national law provides). Since further enshrinement in a 
directive is not enough to render such provisions horizontal, either, then an inequality in the 
level of protection between public and private contexts will be preserved for these rights, as a 
direct consequence of the Court’s insistence upon the validity of Marshall and AMS.  
 
It should firstly be pointed out that, in theory at least, this limitation may prove to be a problem 
for a number of provisions across different parts of the Charter and not just those found in the 
Solidarity chapter. For example, Article 9 (the right to marry and found a family), Article 10(2) 
(the right to conscientious objection), Article 14(3) (aspects of the right to education), and 
Article 16 (the freedom to conduct a business) could all be rendered ineffective in horizontal 
disputes, if references to national laws and practices were taken to be the determining criterion 
for invocability. But it should not be overlooked that the restriction of horizontal effect for 
provisions that refer to national laws and practices in Bauer is likely to continue to operate very 
predominantly as a hurdle for the horizontal effect of the Solidarity chapter. Within the latter, 
Article 31 is exceptional in not deferring to national laws and practices, rather than in doing 
so. The only Solidarity provisions that do not include this statement, other than Article 31, are 
Articles 29 (access to a placement service), 37 (environmental protection), and 38 (consumer 
protection). Are these provisions – the latter two being clearly considered ‘principles’ within 
the Charter’s Explanations59 – any more mandatory or unconditional than, say, Articles 27 or 
28, respectively enshrining the rights to be informed and consulted in the workplace and to 
collective bargaining and action, including strike action? If not, one might altogether question 
the rigour of the justification adduced for distinguishing Bauer from AMS.  
 
More fundamentally, though, even if a reference to national laws and practices could be 
justified as indicative of a structural barrier to direct effect (after all, it does render a degree of 
conditionality fairly obvious), a consistency challenge to the Court’s position should still be 
levied. If we were to zoom out of the Bauer case in order to assess the significance of references 
to national laws and practices in the Court’s broader case law, we might come to question the 
                                                     
59 Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 2007 OJ C 303/17, 27-28. While this is not the 
space to discuss in details the salience of the rights/principles distinction in the Charter, see further: Lord 
Goldsmith QC, ‘A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and Principles’ 38:5 CML Rev (2001), p. 1201; J Krommendijk, 
‘Principled Silence or Mere Silence on Principles? The Role of the EU Charter’s Principles in the Case Law of 
the Court of Justice’ 11:2 EuConst (2015), p. 321; S Peers and S Prechal, ‘Article 52: Scope and Interpretation 
of Rights and Principles’ in S Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary 
(Beck/Hart 2014), para 52.190. 
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objectivity of a criterion based on references to national laws and practices in the first place. 
For example, does Bauer succeed in reconciling AMS, which substantially limited the core 
content of Article 27, with Alemo-Herron, which substantially extended the core content of 
Article 16?60 While both of these provisions refer to national laws and practices, it was only 
the one found in the Solidarity chapter that succumbed to the limitation. In turn, if the Court 
does not always take references to national laws and practices to be determinative of the 
absence of a core EU obligation, as the Alemo-Herron judgment suggests, this begs the 
question of what criteria could be driving this determination.  
 
Inconsistencies such as these are difficult to iron out through case-by-case adjustments of the 
problematic rulings of times past, without a more thorough revision of the qualities of 
horizontality within EU constitutional law, as a space of contestation and, at times, of conflict 
between different types of fundamental rights61 and between fundamental rights and market 
freedoms.62 Seen in this light, Bauer could be taken to suggest that those aspects of the 
Solidarity chapter that have collective and political, rather than individual (or, as the Court put 
it, measurable or ‘pecuniary’63) dimensions, might still not play quite as fundamental a role om 
the Union as the Charter’s other provisions.64 While the ruling stands neatly alongside 
Egenberger and IR in clarifying the relevance of Mangold and, with it, in ensuring the effective 
protection of (some) fundamental rights, its scope and meaningfulness become far more 
uncertain if placed in the context of a line of case law abound workplace politics, where the 
corrosive effects of the Viking heritage continue to hold much of their ground.65  
 
V. Conclusion 
                                                     
60 ECJ 18 July 2013, Case C-426/11, Alemo-Herron and Others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2013:521, 
para 31. Substantial critiques have been made of the use of this provision in the Union: See notably J Prassl, 
‘Freedom of Contract as a General Principle of EU Law? Transfers of Undertakings and the Protection of 
Employer Rights in EU Labour Law (Case C-426/11 Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure)’ 42 Industrial Law 
Journal (2013), p. 434; S Weatherill, ‘Use and Abuse of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights: On the 
Improper Veneration of “Freedom of Contract”’ 10 European Review of Contract Law (2014), p. 157.  
61 Ibid. 
62 ECJ 11 December 2007, Case C-438/05, The International Transport Workers’ Federation and The Finnish 
Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, ECR I-10779; see also ECJ 18 December 2007, 
Case C-341/05, Laval Un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets Avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, ECR I-11767. 
63 Bauer, supra n 1, para 48. 
64 See E Frantziou, ‘Constitutional Reasoning in the European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights: In 
Search of Public Justification’ 25:2 EPL (2019). See further: S Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An assault on 
human rights?’ 7:3 ICON (2003, p. 468, at p. 475. 
65 See A Bogg, ‘Viking and Laval: The International Labour Law Perspective’ in M Freedland and J Prassl (eds), 
EU Law in the Member States: Viking, Laval and Beyond (Hart 2014), p. 41, at p. 71. 
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It is perhaps high time we stopped teaching the Mangold saga as the exception to the non-
horizontality of directives and entirely reversed our analysis. As most recently affirmed in 
Bauer, the constitutional norm now appears to be that the Charter of Fundamental Rights is 
horizontally applicable, at least indirectly and, in many cases, directly as well. There is a limited 
exception to this basic premise, stemming from the Marshall rule, which is that direct 
horizontal effect must be rooted in primary law and not in a directive. In turn, any Charter 
provisions which are not concrete enough as such will not enjoy direct effect in horizontal 
relations simply because they are further expressed in a directive, although they could still 
enjoy indirect effect therein.  
 
As I have highlighted above, in practice, this limitation can have a discernibly negative impact 
on the protection of some fundamental employment rights in the European Union. For rights 
that defer to national laws and practices in particular, it may continue to operate as a cause of 
unequal protection in like cases. Similarly, the rather generous references to AMS in the ruling 
and Opinion appear somewhat underwhelming in revisiting a tradition of horizontality that has, 
at times, been used not only to advance, but also to stall, the operation of fundamental rights in 
the workplace.  
 
It is thus worth asking: should we stay contented with only a near-rejection of the non-
horizontality of directives? Or, in turn, with only a near-endorsement of the relevance of 
fundamental social rights to intersubjective disputes? An effort to resist a continued 
fragmentation of the principle of horizontality and some overarching attempt further to define 
its contours could be significant further improvements in this field. These improvements can 
be built squarely upon the task undertaken in Bauer, which is to set out a clearer constitutional 
role for the Charter in the EU legal order, but they also require a neater hierarchisation of 
fundamental rights within that order, so that the horizontal conflicts often arising in this field 
might, eventually, be resolved. Nevertheless, Grand Chamber judgments like Bauer and 
Egenberger do suggest greater receptiveness on the part of the Court to review this problematic 
line of case law. It is to be hoped that they will not mark the Court’s final word on the horizontal 
effect of the Charter but, rather, the beginning of a deeper engagement with the merits and 
challenges of horizontality in the ever-changing, and ever-more private-centric, field of 
fundamental rights protection in the Union’s constitutional space.  
  
 
